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Stochastic Multiattribute Acceptability Analysis: an application to the 
ranking of Italian regions 
 
Abstract. We consider the issue of ranking regions with respect to a range of economic 
and social variables. Departing from the current practice of aggregating different 
dimensions via a composite index, usually based on an arithmetic mean, we instead use 
Stochastic Multiattribute Acceptability Analysis (SMAA). SMAA considers the “whole 
space” of weights for the considered dimensions. Thus, rather than considering an 
average person giving equal or fixed weights to all dimensions, SMAA explores how 
potential differences in individual preferences regarding the weighting system affect the 
outcome. In this sense, in contrast to the purported objectivity of the many rankings 
supplied by economic institutions and mass media, this proposal enhances, simplifies 
and renders transparent the ranking exercise. The methodology is applied to the ranking 
of Italian regions, showing that the disadvantage of the South regions with respect to the 
North regions (so called “Mezzogiorno problem”) is maintained for the entire spectrum 
of possible preferences with respect to considered dimensions as represented by vectors 
of weights. Thus, our research shows that the well-known North-South divide is 
maintained for classes of individuals with different preferences and it is not related only 
to the representative individual represented by a single vector of weights - very often 
assigning the same importance to all the dimensions. Moreover, to consider possible 
measurement errors, we also tested the stability of the results in front of perturbations of 
the values attained by the regions on the considered dimensions. The analysis we 
conducted unveils patterns of similarity and dissimilarity even within regional economy. 
Many of these findings are neglected within the extant literature addressing the 
“Mezzogiorno” problem. Finally, we propose a class of original multidimensional Gini 
indices and a class of multidimensional polarization indices that measure the 
concentration and polarization of the probability to achieve a given ranking position or 
better, or a given ranking position or worse. These indices confirm the gap between the 
North and South of Italy with more nuance than Gini and polarization indices related to 
single indicators.   
 
Keywords: Stochastic Multiattribute Acceptability Analysis, Regional Development, 
Multiple Criteria Ranking, Composite Index, Multidimensional Gini Indices, 
Multidimensional Polarization Indices. 
  
 
Introduction 
The measurement of regional socio-economic performance has become increasingly 
significant particularly in those countries characterised by persistent economic dualism 
such as Italy. Indeed, defining a comprehensive framework to assess regional 
performance is a crucial factor in both designing and evaluating regional policy.  For 
example, regarding the ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020’ framework, the classification of 
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regions to assign their own eligibility status depends on their ranking in terms of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita1. For the 2014-2020 programming period, in the 
words of the European Commission “…there will be stronger result-orientation and a 
new performance reserve in all European Structural and Investment Funds” (European 
Commission, 2013b, p.3). Therefore, the focus on measuring performance at the 
regional level would be even stronger under the new setting. 
Arguably, issues regarding the measuring regional performance seem to accrue even 
greater significance in the light of the ‘global devolutionary trend’ (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Gill, 2003). The worldwide phenomenon of state-rescaling, whose main economic 
argument stems from seminal contributions premised on higher efficiency (Oates, 1972; 
Tiebout, 1956), has strengthened the need for good quality measurement techniques. 
Accurate, robust, and reliable measurement techniques are crucial to improve the 
accountability and to appraise the efficiency and the related eventual gain of devolved 
units, especially in a world of hard resources constraints (Great Britain, Department for 
Communities and Local government, 2011). 
  
Despite the crucial importance of indicators for socio-economic performance to support 
effective regional policymaking, the actual measurement of regional socio-economic 
performance is far from being clear cut and unambiguously resolved. This is due to 
several problems founded on both technical and conceptual grounds. The most widely-
used measures of economic performance are GDP, or alternatively Gross Value Added 
                                                 
1The regions are classified as ‘less developed’, ‘transition’, and ‘more developed’ in order to adapt the 
level of support and the national contribution co-financing rate. With ‘less developed’ being those 
characterised by GDP per head lower than 75% of EU28 average; transition regions by GDP per capita 
between 75% and 90% of EU28 average; and ‘more developed’ by  GDP per head at least equal to 90% 
of EU28 average (European Commission, 2013a, p. 1).  
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(GVA)2. However, there clearly remains long-standing general criticism about its 
validity as a measure of wellbeing dating back to 1934 (Kuznetz,1934) and more 
recently addressed, among others, by Kubiszewski et al. (2013), Costanza et al. (2009), 
and Stiglitz et al. (2009). Furthermore, once applied to a regional setting, important 
additional caveats also become manifest. Arguably, GDP is a reasonable measure if the 
scope of the analysis is more narrowly limited to the measurement of the regions’ 
output. Nevertheless, it is not able to capture, for example, neither regions’ income, nor 
regional productivity (Dunnell, 2009). Hence, to overcome the limitations of GDP as a 
measure - and subsequent ranking criterion -  of economic performance of regions, 
Dunnell (2009) promotes the use of GVA per hour worked and GVA per filled job as 
productivity measures and Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI) per capita as 
an indicator of the welfare of residents living in a given region. Furthermore, Dunnell 
(2009) suggests the use of labour market indicators3 to give a more complete picture of 
regional and subregional economic performance.  Nonetheless, the inability of GDP to 
capture all dimensions of the well-being of economic agents is broadly accepted.  
These observations on the validity of GDP and other one-dimensional indices to 
measure wellbeing pave the way for the use of composite indices to provide an overall 
evaluation through the aggregation of different dimensions (or ‘criteria’). This rationale 
underpins the use of the Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI) (Annoni and Kozovska, 
2010; Annoni, 2013). The RCI represents a more comprehensive attempt towards 
devising a single measure of regional economic attributes4 at the EU level5. The RCI 
                                                 
2 GVA is equal to GDP plus subsidies less taxes on products. Of course, the choice between GDP and 
GVA does not affect comparison of regions within a country, because differences between regions are the 
same according to both measures.  
3 Namely, employment rates, unemployment rates and economic inactivity rates. 
4 The words ‘attributes’, ‘characteristics’, and ‘criteria’ will be used interchangeably hereafter.   
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builds upon the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), published annually by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) (Schwab, 2009; Schwab and Porter, 2007), and the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook by the Institute for Management Development (IMD, 2008).  
The RCI aims to show strengths and weaknesses of each of the EU NUTS6 2 regions 
and considers a wide range of issues including innovation, quality of institutions, 
infrastructure (including digital networks) and measures of health and human capital 
(Dijkstra et al., 2013).  
Although composite indices give an overall evaluation of social, economic, and 
environmental conditions that are perhaps preferable to reliance on GDP and other one-
dimensional indices, there still remain some methodological questions raised by their 
adoption. Ideally one would like different dimensions to be aggregated in a manner that 
achieves some desirable technical properties such as (i) neutrality (where, all ranked 
countries or regions are be treated equally), or (ii) monotonicity (where an improvement 
in performance should not result in a deterioration in ranking position).  Nardo et al. 
(2008) suggest that, in the spirit of the well-known impossibility Arrow theorem 
(Arrow, 1951), there does not exist any perfect aggregation rule. Accordingly, two main 
pragmatic solutions can be considered:  
Following the Borda rule which assigns a score to each country or region according to 
the following procedure: Each unit (country or region) receives one point for each one 
of the n dimensions in which it is the last, two points for each dimension in which it is 
                                                                                                                                               
5 The Centre for International Competitiveness computes a similar measure of regional competitiveness 
for both world’s leading regions - World Knowledge Competitiveness Index (WKCI) (Huggins et al., 
2008) - and EU-25 NUTS1 regions (Huggins and Davis, 2006). Furthermore, with reference to the UK 
case, it is worth recalling the most recent Huggins and Thompson (2013)’s Competitiveness Index based 
on Huggins (2003).  
6 Nomenclature Units for Territorial Statistics. 
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the last but one, and so on until the n points for the dimensions in which it is first. 
Finally, these points are then summed up; 
Following the Condorcet rule, which is based on the pairwise comparison between 
alternatives, counting the number of dimensions that are in favour of one alternative 
over another one.  
All the proposed aggregation rules can be broadly condensed into these two basic 
approaches. Whichever aggregation procedure is actually adopted, a crucial issue 
remaining for any ranking (or evaluation) exercise generating a single index based on 
socio-economic characteristics, is the choice of weighting system. The WEF (1999)’s 
methodology considered in Lall (2001, p.98) contends   
the weighting system is a priori; the report says that “it was based on the economic literature”, but which 
part of the literature yields the weights is left to imagination. Where in the literature, for instance, weight 
for finance as compared to technology come from? Can it be defined on economic grounds? The answers 
are not clear (p.1516).    
 
The ‘New Global Competitiveness Index GCI’ (WEF, 2008) calculates weights based 
on a regression of the pooled dataset on country GDP per capita and test the stability of 
the model by reallocating individual indicators and assessing the stability of the weights 
and thus the overall score. Nonetheless, WEF (2008, p.56) notes that  
other similar indexes have almost invariably set weights based on subjective priors based on the literature. 
Yet, differences in opinion in the academic literature leave the door open for different choices that can 
compromise the resulting rankings. 
 
Moreover, with regard to the aforementioned RCI the advocates of this measure explicitly 
admit that the RCI is “the result of a long list of subjective choices” (Dijkstra et al., 
2011, p. 16). From a broader perspective the central issue in ranking different entities is 
twofold:  
different attributes are considered;  
different weights for the considered attributes are used.  
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The latter is perhaps the most pernicious problem. Indeed, with respect to the possibility 
of considering different dimensions, it is always possible to enlarge the set of 
considered dimensions to include all the aspects being relevant for almost anybody 
interested in the ranking. However, even if two individuals could agree on the set of 
considered dimensions, it is very rare, or even impossible, that they could completely 
agree on the weights to be assigned to those dimensions, due to, for example, 
fundamental differences in personal preferences.    
It is thus reasonable to posit the question as to whether one should surrender to the 
impossibility of achieving reasonable, robust, and, therefore, useful information for any 
performance ranking exercise? Despite the proliferation of composite socio-economic 
indicators (for a review considering more than 160 different indicators see Bandura, 
2008), the weights set is clearly the manifest problem for composite indices such as, the 
popular Human Development Index (see, among others, Saisana et al. 2005; Permanyer, 
2011; Cherchye et al. 2008, and Foster et al. 2009).  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) attempts to 
overcome the weighting issue by preferring to present a set of nine headline indicators7  
(OECD, 2014) for 362 OECD regions rather than a single composite index. Indeed, the 
choice made by the OECD is not to “make a single statement about the overall well-
being in a region. Instead, we [OECD ] present the information in such a way that 
users can consider the relative importance of each topic and bring their own personal 
evaluations to the questions” (OECD, 2014, p.8). Arguably a range of indicators is 
potentially even more difficult to communicate than a single metric. 
                                                 
7 The considered dimensions are income, jobs, housing, education, health, environment, safety, civic 
engagement, and accessibility of services. 
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This study argues that there is still some space for a more conceptually flexible 
approach ranking by composite index, where additionally one can  more explicitly take 
into account the scope for  attaching different weights to any considered dimensions 
(Helliwell, 2003; Helliwell and Barrington‐Leigh, 2010). The Stochastic Multicriteria 
Acceptability Analysis (SMAA) (Lahdelma, Hokkanen and Salminen, 1998) method 
offers this possibility as it considers the whole set of possible weights (approximated 
through a very large sample of randomly extracted vectors of weights). In this way, it is 
possible to  determine the probability by which each region is first, second, third etc. in 
performance ranking. Moreover, for each pair of regions it is possible to define the 
probability that one region is better than another or vice versa, in every possible 
pairwise comparison. Considering the whole set of possible vectors of weights, amounts 
to considering all the sensitivities, ranging from extreme values taking into account only 
one or few dimensions, to the more even-tempered, taking into account all the 
dimensions. Instead, the usual approach considering a single vector of weights levels 
out all the individuals collapsing them to an abstract and unrealistic set of 
“representative agents”. A plurality of vector of weights relieves robustness concerns 
compared to composite indices. In this respect, several techniques have already been 
popularised (see for example, Saisana et al., 2005; Nardo et al., 2008) . Even non-
academic institutions like the European Institute for Gender Equality have implemented 
such techniques for the construction of composite indices such as the European Gender 
Equality Index (EGEI, see especially chapter 3 in EGEI, 2013). However, in all these 
approaches the focus is on the stability of the obtained results without any systematic 
exploration of the whole range of possible weights. For example, in the EGEI report, 
robustness analysis of the Gender Equality Index is performed considering a certain 
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number of scenarios (i.e. “models”) drawn from the combination of 4 alternatives for 
weighting (2 kinds of equal weights, principal components analysis, AHP (Saaty, 
1988)), 3 aggregation operators (arithmetic, geometric and harmonic mean) and missing 
data imputation (100 simulations). In this way 3,636 sets of scores were computed. The 
median for each of the 27 States within these 3,636 possible scenarios has been 
computed and, then, the “best index” is the one that minimises these differences and lies 
closest to the median. Even this complex procedure does not systematically explore the 
whole spectrum of possible weighting schemes as the SMAA does, instead. 
 In this study we apply SMAA to the ranking of Italian regions with respect to social, 
economic, and environmental aspects. Despite the conspicuous methodological 
difference8, this study closely aligns with the OECD initiative ‘How’s life in your 
region?’ (OECD, 2014) which aims to understand “…people’s level of well-being and 
its determinants […] to gear public policies towards better achieving society’s 
objectives.” (OECD, 2014, p. 4). This OECD study justifies the  focus on the regional 
level because  “…many of the policies that bear most directly on people’s lives are 
local or regional, more fine-grained measures of well-being will help policy-makers to  
enhance  the  design  and  targeting of  policies. They can also empower citizens to 
demand placed-based policy actions that respond to their specific expectations and, in 
turn, to restore people’s trust.” [p. 4]. 
In the light of this OECD claim and by using SMAA, we have directly been able to 
explore the full range of possible weight vectors, because we explicitly consider the 
whole spectrum of preferences and attitudes towards different aspects of well-being. Put 
                                                 
8 As discussed in section 3 the OECD addressed the weighting issue by renouncing to the composite 
index approach in favour of a set of headline indicators.  
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crudely, a businessman might be more interested in economic performance aspects 
rather than in environmental performance aspects and a student might be more 
interested in social performance aspects. These diversified appreciations of various 
aspects of quality of life, determine a consequently different weighting of the 
considered criteria. Therefore, it could be reasonable to expect that some regions would 
be more preferred by some categories of individuals, while other regions would be 
preferred by others. This would be shown by some probability of being in the first rank 
positions despite their ranking based on GDP only.  More specifically, with respect to 
the Italian North-South divide, one could expect that there could be some even small 
probability for the Mezzogiorno regions to be in the first positions for a given set of 
weights. Nonetheless, our research shows that this is not the case and this can be 
interpreted in the following manner. Southern regions of Italy are the less preferred for 
all the different categories of citizens, regardless of their relative preferences about the 
different dimensions of well-being. Essentially this is the core original contribution of 
our research to the discussion of the Italian regional dichotomy. Namely, our study 
shows that the strong performance of the North regions is widespread and generalized to 
all the categories of stakeholders. This conclusion is confirmed and reinforced using a 
class of multidimensional Gini indices and polarisation indices based on the ranking 
acceptability indices that measures both the concentration and the polarisation of the 
probability of obtaining a rank position not worse (or not better) than a given level. 
These indices, originally proposed in this paper, confirm the gap between the North and 
South of Italy with more nuance than Gini indices and polarisation indices related to 
single indicators.    
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that SMAA method is applied to the 
performance ranking of regions and, more generally, for ex-post ranking of territorial 
entities according to their relative performance, instead of an ex-ante evaluation within 
a decision-making process. The proposed methodology can be adapted to study other 
geographic areas with likely different results. Accordingly, it would be valuable to 
investigate which categories of individuals tend to prefer one region over another. With 
respect to the Italian case, the most salient point is the stability in finding the south 
regions across all categories of individuals as the worst regions.   
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 positions the methodology with respect to 
the ranking of regions. Section 3 illustrates our proposal for a new ranking of Italian 
regions. Section 4 concludes. 
 
From subjective objectivity to objective subjectivity in regional economic ranking 
In Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) problems (Figueira et al. 2005; 
Ishizaka and Nemery, 2013) a set of alternatives A={a1,…,am} is evaluated based on a 
set of evaluation criteria G={g1,…,gn} in order to deal with decision problems such as 
choice of the best alternative or ranking of all the alternatives from the best to the worst. 
For example, in regional development ranking, the alternatives are the regions of the 
considered country (e.g., in the case of Italy, twenty regions) and the criteria are the 
dimension with respect to which of these regions should be evaluated (e.g., 
environment, cultural heritage, social capital and so on). The value function most 
commonly used to aggregate the evaluations of alternatives from A with respect to 
criteria from G is the weighted sum, which, after assigning a non-negative weight wi to 
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each criterion giG, w1+…+wn=1, gives to each alternative akA, the following overall 
evaluation: 
 
 
It is worth noticing that different types of means can be expressed in terms of a 
weighted sum of some transformation of the evaluations gi(ak). In greater  detail, in the 
case of  quasilinear means (see Aczel, 1948 and section 4.3.1 in Grabisch et al., 2009) 
we have  
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with f being a strictly monotonic function. If f(x)=log(x), the quasilinear mean becomes 
the weighted geometric mean  
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Considering the geometric mean in terms of quasilinear mean is useful because, for ah, 
ak A, 
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so that one can reformulate comparisons in terms of weighted geometric mean as 
comparisons in terms of weighted arithmetic mean of the logarithm transformations of 
arguments. Let us point out that, with respect to the arithmetic mean, the geometric 
mean has the advantage of not being completely compensatory because it does not 
eq. (1) 
eq. (2) 
eq. (3) 
eq. (4) 
eq. (5) 
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permit to perfectly rebalance worst evaluations on one criterion with better evaluations 
on other criteria. Indeed, the non-compensatoriness of composite indices has been a 
largely discussed issue (see e.g. Munda and Nardo, 2009, Casadio Tarabusi and Guarini, 
2013, Mazziotta and Pareto, 2016) and the most adopted aggregation function to avoid 
complete compensatoriness is the geometric mean that has been recently adopted for the 
Human Development Index (UNDP, 2010). From an economic point of view, the 
weighted geometric mean is interesting to the extent it corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function that is one of the most frequently used in economic models.   
Very often one considers a simple arithmetic mean of the evaluations gi(ak) that criteria 
giG gives to alternatives akA, that is to assign an equal weight to each criterion. Two 
main questions arise: how is the ranking of an alternative ak changing when the weights 
of considered criteria change? Given two alternatives ak and ah from A, is it larger the 
set of weights wi for which ak is preferred to ah, or that one for which ah is preferred to 
ak? 
Within MCDA these questions were addressed by the Stochastic Multiobjective 
Acceptability Analysis (SMAA) (Lahdelma, Hokkanen and Salminen, 1998;  Lahdelma 
and Salminen, 2001; for two surveys see Tervonen and Figueira, 2008 and Lahdelma 
and Salminen, 2010). SMAA belongs to the family of MCDA methods aiming to 
provide recommendations on the problem at hand considering uncertainty or 
imprecision on the considered data and preference parameters.  
In order to handle imprecision with respect to the weights assigned to the criteria and to 
the evaluations taken on criteria under attention, SMAA considers two probability 
distributions fW(w) and fχ(ξ ) on W and χ, respectively, where  
W = {(w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Rn: wi ≥ 0,  i=1,…n, and w1+ . . . +wn=1} eq. (6) 
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and χ is the evaluation space, i.e. the space of the value that can be taken by criteria 
giG.   
First of all, SMAA introduces a ranking function relative to the alternative ak: 
 
where ρ(false) = 0 and ρ(true) = 1. 
Then, for each alternative ah, for each evaluation of alternatives ξ ∈ χ and for each rank 
r = 1, . . . , l, SMAA computes the set of weights of criteria for which alternative ak 
assumes rank r: 
 
SMAA is based on the computation of the following indices: 
• The rank acceptability index: it is the measure of the set of weight vectors and 
evaluations on considered criteria for which the alternative ak gets rank r: 
 
r
kb  represents the probability that alternative ak has the r-th position in the preference 
ranking. Let us remark that the rank acceptability index can be abridged to the Borda 
rule approach, because it is based on a scoring of each alternative. Moreover, the 
alternatives ak for which 
1
kb >0, i.e. the alternatives for which there exists at least one 
vector of weights for which they are the best, correspond to the efficient alternatives in 
the Data Envelope Analysis (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1987).  
eq. (7) 
eq. (8) 
eq. (9) 
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• The central weight vector: it is the barycentre of the set of weight vectors for which ak 
is the best alternative and, consequently, it represents the preferences of the average 
individual giving to ak the best position. It is formulated as follows: 
 
Of course, one can consider also the barycentre of the set of weight vectors for which ak 
is the worst alternative, representing the preferences of the average individual giving to 
ak the worst position. 
• The confidence factor: it gives the frequency with which an alternative is the most 
preferred one using its central weight vector and it is given by: 
 
 
Another interesting index in SMAA is the pairwise winning index (Leskinen et al., 
2006), which gives the frequency that an alternative ah is preferred or indifferent to an 
alternative ak in the space of possible weight vectors and possible evaluations on single 
criteria: 
 
Therefore, the pairwise winning index is more in the line of the aforementioned 
Condorcet rule, because it is related to comparisons of couples of alternatives. 
From a computational point of view, the multidimensional integrals defining the 
considered indices are estimated by using the Monte Carlo method. It is worth 
observing that in case the evaluations on criteria are known and therefore the only 
eq. (10) 
eq. (12) 
eq. (11) 
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variability remains on the vectors of weights (w1, . . . , wn), which are supposed to be 
uniformly distributed in the simplex W, then one can compute the pairwise winning 
indices phk using the exact formula given by Zheng and Zheng (2015). However, this 
formula cannot be used to compute the ranking acceptability indices krb  and, moreover, 
for the values phk the estimates supplied by the Monte Carlo method are surely 
acceptable (e.g. Tervonen and Ladhelma (2007) shows that 10,000 extractions are 
enough to get an error limit of 0,01 for krb  with a confidence of 95%).    
In our application, for the sake of simplicity, we consider a uniform probability 
distributions fW(w) on W. Moreover, again to remain as simple as possible, we have not 
considered the probability distribution fχ(ξ) in a first computation in which imprecision 
in the data was not considered and, again, a specific uniform distribution in a second 
computation in which robustness with respect to errors in the measurement was tested. 
However, as explained in the following section, we have taken indirectly into account 
imprecision in the data through the normalization we have adopted.    
We also use the rank acceptability index krb  to define a new multidimensional 
generalization of the Gini index. First, for each r=1,…,n-1 let us consider the upward 
cumulative rank acceptability index of position l, l=1,…,n-1, as the probability that an 
alternative ak has a rank position l or better (Angilella et al. 2016), that is 



l
s
k
s
k
l bb
1
 . 
Now one can compute the Gini index of the upward cumulative rank acceptability index 
of position l, that is  
eq. (13) 
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Gl measures the concentration of probability to attain rank position l or better among 
the considered alternatives. The Gl based on the rank acceptability indices krb , takes 
into account all the possible vectors of weights and it is not based on a specific and to 
some extent arbitrary single vector of weights, as it is the case in the multidimensional 
concentration indices proposed in literature (for a review see e.g. Savaglio 2006 and 
Weymark 2006).  An index analogous to Gl but measuring the concentration of 
probability to attain rank position l or worse, l=2,…,n, among the considered 
alternatives can be defined analogously as  
)1(2
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where  



n
ls
k
s
k
l bb , 
is the downward cumulative rank acceptability index of position for alternative ak 
(Angilella et al. 2016).  
eq. (14) 
eq. (15) 
eq. (16) 
eq. (17) 
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The two classes of inequality indices Gl and Gl  are related as shown by the following 
result. 
Proposition. For any l=2,…,n, the following property hold 
.
1
1 1
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 ll G
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Proof. Since the probability of an alternative ak to be ranked in position l or worse is the 
complement of the probability to be ranked in position l-1 or better, that is  kl
k
l bb 11   , 
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 
Besides Gini indices Gl and Gl, upward and downward cumulative rank acceptability 
indices  klb  and 
k
lb can be used to define a class of polarisation indices (for the concept 
of polarisation indices and its difference with concentration indices see Esteban and Ray 
1994, Esteban et al. 2007, Wolfson 1994), measuring how much polarised is the 
probability to live in a region having a rank position l or better (in case of using indices 
k
lb ), or the probability to live in a region having a rank position l or worse (in case of 
using indices klb ). In particular, we considered the polarization index proposed by 
Esteban and Ray (1994) corrected as proposed by Esteban et al. (2007). More 
precisely, with respect to the upward cumulative rank acceptability index klb ,  
eq. (18) 
eq. (19) 
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l=1,…,n-1, we computed the mean value Mlb of the upward cumulative rank 
acceptability indices klb , k=1,….,n, that is 
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With Pk, being the population of the k-th region,  k=1,….,n. After we calculated the 
normalized upward cumulative rank acceptability indices klb
~
, that is 
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Following the methodology proposed by Aghevli and Mehran (1981) and Davies 
and Shorrocks (1989), we found also an optimal partition l of the distribution 
l
F
 in r groups minimise the Gini index value of within-group inequality, r≤n, that 
is  
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Finally we computed the polarization index EGRl as follows: 
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with [1,1.16] is the sensitivity to polarization and ≥0. In our application to the study 
of Italian regions we considered 2 groups in the partition l , =1 and  =1. Analogous 
eq. (20) 
eq. (21) 
eq. (22) 
eq. (23) 
eq. (24) 
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polarization indices EGRl, l=1,…,n-1,  can be defined with respect to the downward 
cumulative rank acceptability index klb . Observe that the polarization indices EGR
l and 
EGRl have multidimensional nature so that they have to be evaluated also as a 
contribution to the literature on multidimensional polarization indices (see e.g. 
Gigliarano and Mosler, 2009; Sheicher, 2010; Aleskerov and Oleynik, 2016). 
In what follows we apply the SMAA methodology to the ranking of Italian regions 
(spatial alternatives A={a1,…, am}) using a set of socio-economic and environmental 
variables as evaluation criteria (G={g1,…,gn}) to be evaluated according to the set of 
weights W.  
 
Application to performance ranking of Italian regions  
Building upon Guerrieri and Iammarino (2006)9 we apply the aforementioned SMAA to 
rank the 20 Italian regions according to a set of 65 indicators belonging to the newly 
introduced ‘BES10: Equitable and Sustainable Well-being’ database (ISTAT, 2015). 
Table A.1 in appendix reports variables description along with summary statistics. 
Please note also that the last column of Table A.1 reports the categorization of each 
variable according the good/bad nature of the considered criteria.    
The BES dataset represents a powerful instrument to analyse social, economic, and 
environmental characteristics of Italian regions. We consider the subset of 65 variables 
reported in appendix with regard to the year 2014 as it represents the most recent year 
for which a balanced dataset can be extracted. Therefore, the ranking related to these 
                                                 
9 It is worth noticing that Guerrieri and Iammarino (2006) already provided an analysis more 
comprehensive than the one based on a single indicator. Nonetheless, the methodological approach is 
substantially different. Guerrini and Iammarino (2006) adopt the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to 
“obtain new summary-variables to encapsulate all the information available through linear combinations, 
while at the same time identifying the interdependencies among the original variables” (p. 170).   
10 From the Italian Benessere Equo e Sostenibile.  Website: http://www.istat.it/en/archive/180526 
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variables contains a large amount of information on many aspects of regional 
development; one that goes well beyond the mainstream measure(s) of regional 
economic output (e.g. GVA or GDP). This choice is in line with the idea of the multi-
dimensionality of quality of life widely accepted in the literature (Stiglitz et al., 2009; 
OECD, 2011). As it is well known, Italy has a long history of economic dualism dating 
back to the unification process in 1861 (Del Monte and De Luzenberger, 1989; 
Spadavecchia, 2007; Torrisi et al. 2015). Our results confirm such a socio-economic 
dualism along with the several dimensions here considered. Building upon Pike et al. 
(2012) we preliminary consider the issue of concentration and polarisation, separately. 
Indeed, it is well known that inequality measures could be low despite the presence of a 
strong polarisation (Esteban and Ray, 1994). Therefore, particularly in the case of the 
sharp dualism characterising the income distribution among the Italian regions, it is 
worth analysing the distribution of the several dimensions at hand according to both 
angles. Table 1 reports measures of concentration (Gini index) and polarization EGR 
(Esteban, Gardìn, and Ray, 2007) index for each of the 65 variables.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
From Table 1 it is worth stressing that there are variables showing levels of 
concentration and polarization much higher than the Households Disposable Income 
(HDI)11 (Gini index of 0.10 and an EGR index of 0.06). Overall, the inequality 
measures range from 0.02 (SOC3) to 0.47 (ENV3). Furthermore, two key aspects - 
Employment and Social Conditions - show Gini indices as high as about 0.26 
(WORK2) and 0.21 (SOC7) and an EGR index of 0.15 and 0.10, respectively.  
                                                 
11 As shown in Table A.1 the variable Econw1 refers to HDI.  
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An in-depth analysis of the disparities in every single dimension goes beyond the scope 
of the present work; nonetheless, even the brief considerations developed above gives 
insight of the dualism involving a whole spectrum of indicators of social, economic, and 
environmental characteristics of Italian regions. 
 Inevitably, the resulting ranking exercise – representing a synthesis of the above 
dimensions - will somewhat reflect such a dualism with Northern regions. We 
proceeded as follows. 
Taking inspiration from Mazziotta and Pareto (2016), to make comparable variables 
expressed on different metric we normalised them according to the following formula 
that assigns to each value x on a “good criterion”, that is a criterion with a preference 
increasing with respect to the assigned value (e.g. gross domestic product), the 
normalized value 
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In case of a “bad criterion”, that is a criterion with a preference decreasing with respect 
to the assigned value (e.g. the social exclusion), the normalized value x  of x is given by  
eq. (27) 
eq. (25) 
eq. (26) 
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The idea is to consider as extreme of the normalization scales the values M-3 and 
M+3 within which lie 99,73% of values in case of normal distribution and, by the 
Chebyshev's inequality, 89% of values for any distribution for which an average and 
standard deviation are defined.   
For illustrative purposes, we begin with the evaluation according to the usual arithmetic 
mean (equal weights) of the performances normalized on the interval having as extreme 
the minimum and the maximum evaluations, that is 
 
 
in case of a “good criterion”, or 
 
in case of a “bad criterion”.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
eq. (29) 
eq. (30) 
eq. (31) 
eq. (28) 
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Moreover, the data normalized according to eq. 8 and eq. 9 were aggregated using a 
weighted geometric mean, because it allows one to avoid complete compensatoriness as 
discussed in Section 2. Both the resulting composite indices are shown in Table 2.   As 
expected, in both cases Northern regions have overall a better performance than 
Southern ones. For example, in both rankings Trentino Alto Adige achieves the first 
position followed by Friuli-Venezia Giulia. The third position is taken by Emilia 
Romagna followed by Toscana in fourth position in the ranking of the composite index 
based on arithmetic means, while the two regions occupy the same position but in 
inverse order in the ranking based on geometric mean. The fifth position is attained by 
Valle d’Aosta in the ranking of composite index based on arithmetic mean, while in the 
ranking of the composite index based on geometric mean there is Piemonte. As for the 
bottom five positions, Calabria ranks 16th, followed by Basilicata, Puglia, Sardegna, 
and Campania for the composite index based on the arithmetic mean, while for the 
composite index based on the geometric mean, in the same rank position there are 
Basilicata, Calabria, Puglia, Campania and Sicilia. The most striking differences 
between ranking regards Sardegna and Sicilia, with the former being 19th in the ranking 
based on arithmetic mean and 13rd in the ranking based on geometric mean, and the 
latter being 13rd and 20th, respectively.  The Kendall Tau of the two rankings is 0.811.  
Afterwards, to carry out further analysis of this ranking, we used the SMAA approach 
on the composite index based on geometric mean with the aim of exploring the whole 
space of possible weight vectors considering the whole spectrum of possible individual 
preferences. In this perspective one could expect that some region could be more 
preferred by some categories of individuals, while other regions could be preferred by 
others. This would be proved by some probability of being in the first rank positions 
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also for regions that usually are at the last positions of the usual rankings. More 
specifically, with respect to the Italian North-South divide one could expect that there 
could be some even small probability for the Mezzogiorno regions to be in the first 
positions. Our research shows that this is not the case and this can be interpreted as 
showing that Southern regions of Italy are the less preferred by all the different 
categories of citizens. This is the key original contribution of our research to explaining 
the Italian dichotomy. That is, our study shows that the prevalence of the North regions 
is widespread and generalized to all the categories of stakeholders.  
Hence, our approach unveils important aspects of this North-South dualism. It addresses 
pivotal questions for policy implementation and evaluation related to questions about 
the relative performance of regions. For example, how robust is the observed dualism 
with respect to the relative importance granted to each dimension? To what extent are 
the Northern (or Southern) regions alike?  
Despite their crucial relevance, indeed, the above questions can have only limited or no 
answer according to the mainstream approach based on weighted arithmetic mean of an 
opportune transformation of considered dimensions. This approach is followed, for 
example, by the EU to build the EU Regional Competitiveness Index12 (Annoni and 
Kozovska, 2010; Dijkstra et al., 2011) and by the United Nations to calculate the HDI 
(Anand and Sen, 1997, Herrero et al., 2010).  Indeed, the weighting issue is still 
controversial and even sophisticated attempts to achieve a common weighing 
framework to be applied to composite wellbeing measures have not been fully 
convincing (for a general discussion about the weighting issue as applied to well-being 
                                                 
12 Although we acknowledge that the cited index does perform a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness 
of the weighting vectors, it is worth stressing that it limits the analysis to a given interval (Dijkstra et al., 
2011) with range lower or equal to 0.2 according to the development stage. Similarly, with respect to the 
UK case, Huggins (2010) tests the robustness of the UK Competitiveness Index by means of alternative 
single values for the chosen weights.   
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measures see, for example, Decancq and Lugo, 2008). Nonetheless, mainstream 
composite indices of regional socio-economic performance do not allow for differences 
in the weighting system and are thus effectively maintaining an unwarranted mask of 
objectivity. They implicitly assume equal weighting which may not be justified with 
respect to the preferences of different groups of individuals. The equal weighting 
assumption  runs counter to a policy world that values  local preferences, and hence runs 
counter to  the seminal contributions founded on their importance. These relate to 
different preferences for sets of local public goods  as per the Tiebout (1956) model and 
further developments in  fiscal federalism building upon the work of Oates (1972).  
The OECD proposed overcoming the weighting issue by presenting a set of nine 
headline indicators13 rather than a single composite index (OECD, 2014) for 362 OECD 
regions. Arguably, this approach is potentially even more difficult to communicate to 
the public and decision-makers alike. 
The SMAA approach can make a substantial contribution to achieving a better balance 
in the debates regarding the trade-off between a composite index and a range of 
indicators. On the one hand, SMAA allows for maximum variety in the relative 
evaluation of each dimension of wellbeing. On the other hand, in principle. it does not 
prevent computation of a composite index based on a set of regional characteristics. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to apply SMAA as a method offering a broader 
methodological perspective in tackling the measurement of regional well-being.  
Following the SMAA approach, we considered a uniform sampling of 1,000,000 of 
weights vectors. In order to take into account differences in the weighting of each 
characteristic (concerning dimensions of regional social, economic, and environmental 
                                                 
13 The considered dimensions are income, jobs, housing, education, health, environment, safety, civic 
engagement, and accessibility of services. 
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performance) – potentially reflecting differences in preferences - we explicitly highlight 
the unavoidable subjectivity behind any ranking exercise simply through applying the 
SMAA approach. Table 3 reports the resulting ranking.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
For the sake of clarity, rather than reporting Rank Acceptability Index (RAI), i.e. the 
ratio between the occurrences a region achieves a given rank and the total number of 
cases considered, in Table 3 we preferred to show the Rank Frequency (RF). Therefore, 
Table 3 reports the number of occurrences, out of the 1 million cases, a region achieves 
each possible ranking from 1 to 20, depending on different weights assigned to each of 
the 65 considered dimensions. Indeed, numerical approximations could assign a 
misleading null probability to some RAI in cases in which, even if with a small number 
of occurrences, RF is not null. However, when there is no risk of these misleading 
conclusions, we refer to RAI rather than to RF (because, of course, RAI=RF/1,000,000). 
In Table 3, for example, one can see that Piemonte never ranks 1st or 2nd and it ranks 
3rd in 10 times out of the 1 million cases considered. Furthermore, it never ranks 12th 
or worse (i.e. the related RF is null).  Furthermore, for each extraction, the set of vectors 
of weights generating a given ranking can be stored. Hence, an interesting by-product of 
the analysis is represented – for each region – by the set of weight generating its best, 
that is the central weight vector recalled in section 2, and worst performance in terms of 
ranking. Table 4 reports the five criteria with greatest average weights in the set of 
vector of weights assigning the best position to the corresponding region. Table 5, vice 
versa, reports the five criteria with greatest average weights corresponding to the worst 
position of considered region. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 The analogous tables with the weights of all criteria can be found in electronic 
appendix. The information about the weights giving the best and the worst position 
supplies interesting elements to analyse the key factors determining good and bad 
evaluations by citizens. For example, Trentino Alto Adige is the most preferred region 
for almost all the vector weights and thus it is not surprising that the average vector of 
weights assigning it the first position is giving substantially an equal weight to all 
criteria. However, it is interesting to investigate which is the average vector of the 
weights for which Trentino Alto Adige is attaining its worst position (being the 4th) 
when the greatest weights are taken by criteria HEALTH3 (0.03), WORK8 (0.03), 
WORK6 (0.029), HEALTH5 (0.025) and POL2 (0.025), that, therefore, are the criteria 
more important for the average individual appreciating Trentino-Alto Adige to a lesser 
extent. We have also tested the stability of the central weight vectors for the four 
regions for which is not null the probability to be the most preferred by computing the 
relative confidence factor. We proceeded as follows. We generated perturbed 
evaluations on considered criteria for all the regions by extracting random values in the 
interval 
   [gi(a)-0.25i, gi(a)+ 0.25i] 
for the evaluations of each region a on considered criteria gi, where i is the standard 
deviation of the criterion gi, i=1,….,65. Taking the central weight vector of the region 
a* for which we test the stability of the weight vector giving it the best position, we 
computed the new ranking corresponding to the perturbed evaluations. We repeated this 
procedure 1,000,000 times and we got an estimation that the region a* remains the best. 
This probability is 100% for Trentino Alto Adige, 87.2% for Toscana, 84,5% for Emilia 
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Romagna and 80% for Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Thus, we can conclude that the indications 
supplied by the central weight vector are quite stable. 
Overall, Table 3 – considering all the variations in weights -  confirms the North-South 
divide according to the wider perspective at hand. Based on a rather comprehensive set 
of indicators, including but not confined to GDP, and a comprehensive set of possible 
weights, Northern and Centre regions perform generally better than Southern regions. 
On this regard, it is worth stressing here three main elements. First, only Centre-
Northern regions (Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, and 
Toscana) ranked first at least once. Second, only Southern regions (Campania, Puglia, 
Calabria, and Sicilia) ranked last at least once. Third, their best rank is as low as 16th 
(Campania), 16th (Puglia), 9th (Calabria), and 17th (Sicilia). However, within the group 
of the four above regions under consideration, Calabria achieves its highest rank of 9 in 
just 2 cases out of the million cases here considered. Within this big picture, Sardegna 
represents a notable exception. Indeed, its best rank is 5th (though in just 30 out of the 
million cases considered), its lowest rank is 17h, and it achieves with its highest 
frequency the 13th rank in 318,317 cases out of the 1 million cases considered, hence, in 
about 1/3 of cases. The contrast with the other main island is sharp. Indeed, Sicilia, as 
already mentioned, never ranks better than 17th and its highest RAI of about 66% (i.e. 
about 2 out of 3 cases) corresponds to the last rank.  
On the same premise, although Table 3 reports the RF for all ranks, in what follows the 
analysis will focus on the highest RF for each region. The argument for this is that the 
rank related to the highest RF for each region is the rank the region achieves with the 
highest probability, and, therefore, with the highest level of robustness. Table 3 shows 
that the region with the highest RF in the first position is Trentino (with a RAI of 
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99.96%). Friuli-Venezia Giulia achieved the highest RF in the second position (with a 
RAI of 45.63%). Toscana, Emilia Romagna, and Valle d’Aosta, achieved the highest 
rank in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th position with a RAI of 43.37%, 50.06%, and 31.64%, 
respectively. That is to say, Trentino achieves the first position in this ranking exercise 
with a rather massive degree of robustness to the choice of different weighting vectors. 
On the same premise, the data related to the other four aforementioned Centre-North 
regions achieve the subsequent four ranks with a substantially high robustness (at least 
in 30% of cases).  
Piemonte shows a datum of similar magnitude with its highest RAI of 45.94% referring 
to the 5th position. The remaining positions show a quite high degree of variation with 
maximum RAIs between 25.34% (Lazio, 12th position) and 91.51% (Calabria, 17th). 
Nonetheless, the Southern highest RAIs lay in the area characterised by a rank of 13 or 
worse, yet, with the already mentioned exception of Sardegna; furthermore, Southern 
highest RAIs are never below the threshold of 30%.  
From a slightly different angle, as far as the bottom five positions are concerned, our 
analysis confirms that the general wisdom concerning the Southern generalised low 
performance has a robust basis. Indeed, Basilicata, Calabria, Puglia, Campania, and 
Sicilia show their own highest RAI in the 16th, seventeen17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th rank. 
with RAIs of 89.64%, 91.50%, 70.71%, 55.21%, and 66.46%, respectively.   
The above results do confirm that the North-South divide is definitely wider than the 
one measured simply in terms of GDP. Moreover, the geographical divide is robust to a 
massive variety of weighting choices. In other words, it is not reasonable to imagine a 
set of weights able to result in a different overall picture in terms of regional disparities.      
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To further address this issue, building upon Angilella et al. (2013), Table 6 reports the 
upward cumulated RAIs klb  for each rank.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Therefore, for any rank, values in Table 6 show the probability of achieving at least that 
rank. For example, while Piemonte achieves a rank of 4 or above14 with probability 
0.002, Valle d’Aosta ranks 2nd or better with probability 0.003, and so on so forth.  
From Table 6, it is worth noticing that 4 regions out of 20 have a probability of (or very 
close to) 1, to be ranked 5th or better. Namely, Trentino Alto Adige, Emilia Romagna 
(probability of 0.996), Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Toscana. Conversely, there are 
regions like Marche and those from Abruzzo to Sardegna (in the order they appear in 
Table 6), with a null probability of belonging to the group of top five regions. 
Furthermore, Liguria, Umbria, and Lazio register a very low probability to rank 5th or 
better (0.003, 0.005, and 0.002, respectively). In order to provide an even more intuitive 
representation of this evidence, Graph 1 shows a map of the cumulated RAIs reported in 
Table 6. INSERT GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE 
The Italian dualism is apparent with only Northern regions having a chance to belong to 
the group of top five regions according to different weighting vectors. A 
complementary15 Graph 2 below reports the probability of belonging to the group of 
bottom 5 regions.  
INSERT GRAPH 2 ABOUT HERE 
Graph 2, while confirming from a different perspective the evidence reported in Graph 
1, offers interesting elements of differentiation between Southern and Islands regions. 
                                                 
14 In that precise case the number represents exactly the probability to achieve rank 4 as the probabilities 
related to higher ranks are null.  
15 Data reported in Graph 2 come from applying the complement rule to probabilities related to rank 16 
reported in Table 8 4. 
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First, a white area emerges in the heart of the darkness of Southern regions competing 
in the Italian regional “relegation zone”: it refers to the Basilicata datum (probability of 
only 0.078). Similarly, Abruzzo has a 0.03 probability of belonging to the same group. 
Sardegna even shows a null probability of belonging to the group of bottom five 
regions. To some extent, therefore, according to this peculiar perspective, Abruzzo, 
Basilicata, and Sardegna represent a kind of “Northern regions within the Southern 
broad region”. Put differently, in a Southern broad region generally lagging behind the 
Northern one, Abruzzo, Basilicata, and Sardegna perform generally better than the 
regions belonging to their broad region.  
The RAI approach allows the comparison of regional performance along the cross-
sectional dimension. Thus, by comparing RAIs we are able to compare the overall 
probability of achieving a given rank between regions. For example, as noted above, the 
4th position is achieved by Piemonte in about 0.2% of cases, while Valle d’Aosta 
achieves the same position in about 6% of cases. Nonetheless, RAIs fail to provide a 
direct comparison of the two regions. RAIs tell us that, overall, Piemonte performed 
better than 15 regions and worse than four other regions in about 0.2% of cases. Or, in 
the cumulated case, the same region (Piemonte) performed at least better than 16 other 
regions in about 0.2% of the cases. However, neither the simple RAIs nor the cumulated 
ones are able to give information about the direct comparison between two regions. For 
example, what is the probability of Piemonte achieving a rank higher than the neighbour 
Lombardia? Or, with regard to the previous case, what is the probability of Piemonte 
achieving a rank better than Valle d’Aosta?  
Clearly, an answer to this kind of questions is crucial in both policy design and policy 
evaluation as they provide information on the relative performance of potentially similar 
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jurisdictions. In order to answer this kind of questions, we provide in Table 7 the 
Pairwise Comparison Index (PCI) for each couple of regions.   
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Table 7 shows the pairwise winning indices phk  that gives the region ah the probability 
to obtain a better score than region ak. Thus, figures reported in each row represent 
relative frequencies of the region in that row achieving a score higher than regions 
reported in columns according to the rule ‘row wins against column’. Hence, regarding 
the previously mentioned direct comparison Piemonte vs Lombardia, Piemonte 
achieved a better score than Lombardia in about 78% of cases. Of course, symmetrically 
Lombardia performed better than Piemonte in about 22% of cases. The last column of 
Table 7 reporting the Average PCI (APCI) aims to provide a synthetic measure of the 
overall performance of each region with respect to other region. Thus for a region ak , 
the corresponding APCI, denoted qk, is given by the arithmetic mean of the PCI pkh  of 
region ak with respect to other regions ah, that is 
.
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Of course, the APCI ranges from zero (i.e. the region achieves a lower score than the 
remaining 19 in all cases considered) to 1 (i.e. the region achieves a better score than all 
the “opponents” in all cases). Therefore, Trentino Alto Adige (APCI of 116), Toscana 
(API of 0.908), and Emilia Romagna (APCI of 0.876) confirm to be “champions” also 
according to this peculiar perspective. On the other edge, Sicilia with an APCI of only 
7% confirms all its weakness in this context. Furthermore, in terms of North-South 
divide, Table 7 shows that from Abruzzo to Sicilia, in only very minor occurrences a 
                                                 
16 The exact value being equal to 0.99997475. 
eq. (32) 
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Southern region achieves a better score than regions belonging to the Centre-North 
broad region. Noteworthy, Sardegna has a better performance than the Southern 
Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, and Sicilia in all the cases here considered. In 
12,5% of cases it performs even better than the Northern Veneto.  
For the sake of conciseness, we do not analyse all the pairwise comparisons reported in 
Table 7. Nonetheless, it is worth stressing here that our approach allowing the direct 
comparison of pairs of regions unveils patterns of both similarity and dissimilarity even 
within the same broad region. In so doing, it makes a substantial contribution aiming to 
go a step further the already widely researched North-South divide.  
Finally let us apply to this analysis indices Gl and Gl that are shown in Table 8 along 
with the polarisation indices EGRl and EGRl. They confirm a great concentration, 
especially for the best rank positions, as shown by the very high values of Gl for small 
l, and for the worst rank positions, as shown by the very high values of Gl for great l.  
Let us observe that the levels of concentration are not only much higher than the 
Households Disposable Income, but also of all the inequality measures of single 
indicators shown in Table 1. The same evidence overall applies to EGR indices.   
This further proves that the comprehensive North-South divide is exacerbating the 
concentration present in the considered attributes taken singularly and, moreover, it is 
not related to a given vector of weights assigned to the considered criteria, because the 
RAI on which Gl and G  are based take into account the whole variety of all possible 
vectors of weights. Table 8 reports the whole set of Gini indices.  
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Since each variable may be affected by measurement error, (see e.g. LeSage 1999), we 
have further taken in consideration perturbations in the values assigned to each region 
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by the 65 variables of the BES data set proceeding as follows. More precisely, we 
considered an interval of variation  
[gi(a)-ki, gi(a)+ki] 
for the evaluations of each region a on considered criteria gi, where i is the standard 
deviation of the criterion gi, i=1,….,65 and k≥0. The case k=0 corresponds to the 
absence of any perturbation, that is, the case of RF in above Table 2. We further 
considered the case k=0.25, k=0.5 and k=1. In each one of these case and in each one of 
1,000,000 of iterations we randomly extracted not only a vector of weights for the 65 
criteria, but also a perturbed evaluation  ag i
~  in the considered range for each region a 
on each criterion gi, i=1,….,65. On the basis of the perturbed values, for each one of the 
65 criteria considered by BES, we computed the “perturbed mean” and the “perturbed 
standard deviation” and we normalized according to equations (8) and (9) the perturbed 
evaluations  ag i
~ . The RF and the PWI corresponding to k=0.25 are shown in Table A.3 
and Table A.4, respectively. The analogous tables for k=0.5 and k=1 can be found in the 
electronic appendix.  
In order to assess the consistency and reliability of the resulting ranking, the Intraclass 
Correlation Coefficient (ICC) has been computed considering the above k=0.25, 0.5, 
and 1 as resulting from alternative evaluation exercises performed by 3 additional raters 
with respect to the actual measurement released by the Italian National Institute of 
Statistics. To this end, the consistency-of-agreement ICC (CA-ICC) has been used. The 
rationale for adopting the CA-ICC is that different measurements are considered 
consistent if the scores from any two measurements (or raters) give the same ranking to 
all the regions (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979; McGraw and Wong, 1996a, 1996b). The results 
reported in Table A.4 show that our ranking exercise is robust to the substantial 
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differences in measurement here hypothesised. Indeed, both the individual and the 
average coefficients are in no occasion17 lower than 0.60 with 15 out of the 20 ranking 
here considered showing a ICC higher than 0.80.  
 
To summarise: the existence of the North-South divide in Italy is empirically robust to a 
detailed consideration of a wide variety of dimensions, weighting choices, and 
measurement errors.   
 
Concluding remarks 
The SMAA technique has been justified, explained and applied to the performance 
ranking of Italian regions. This involved a set of socio-economic and environmental 
indicators, including but not confined to GDP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to explore differences in local development using such an approach 
permitting to take into consideration different preferences of different class of 
individuals corresponding to different weight vectors. In the Italian regional context 
characterised by a strong and persistent dualism, this exercise has two main features. 
First, it allows for a validation of computational results based on prior knowledge of 
both quantitative and qualitative aspects the Italian regions built over decades of 
research involving the questione meridionale (Southern question). To some extent the 
analysis at hand confirms that (i) the North-South divide is definitely wider than if 
measured simply in terms of GDP and that (ii) the presence of uneven patterns of 
regional development seem robust to an extensive massive variety of weighting choices 
                                                 
17 All the ICC are statistically significant according to related F-test.  
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and perturbations of values on the dimensions considered (thus taking into account also 
measurement errors).  
Second, our approach based on SMAA methodology is able to unveil patterns of spatial 
disparities more clearly than seems present in the extant empirical literature on the 
Italian North-South divide. Our analysis finds clear-cut and robust evidence of a 
generalised better performance of Sardegna with respect to the other big island (Sicilia) 
and, overall, with respect to the broader Southern region. This study has also proposed a 
class of original multidimensional concentration and polarisation indices. With regard to 
concentration we propose Gini indices that measure the concentration of the probability 
of attaining good or poor ranking positions. Similarly, we propose a novel 
multidimensional extension of the EGR index to analyse the polarisation of the above 
probabilities. These indices measure a gap between the North and South of Italy that is 
even more severe than the indices related to single dimensions would indicate.       
The implementation of more advanced techniques to unveil and highlight the 
subjectivity involved in any ranking of territorial units is open for future research 
attention. Specifically, more advanced models could be developed to take into 
consideration the interaction between criteria (Angilella, Corrente and Greco, 2015) and 
the hierarchy of criteria (Angilella, Corrente, Greco and Slowinski, 2015). Nonetheless, 
our exploratory analysis demonstrates the utility of the SMAA approach – which is even 
potentially applicable in cross-national comparisons. It is able to make a substantial 
contribution to achieve robust evaluation of the relative socio-economic performance 
moving from ‘subjective objectivity’ and towards more ‘objective subjectivity’.  
Essentially, the SMAA approach can objectively take into consideration the ‘inner 
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subjectivity’ of all evaluation derived from aggregation of different dimensions with the 
full spectrum of different weighting choices.    
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                   Table 1 – Disparities in SOC8al, economic, and environmental indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
 
Disparities in SOC8al, economic, and environmental indicators  
  
              
  
Health    Education   Working Conditions   Economic Welfare   
Variable Gini EGR 
 
Variable Gini EGR 
 
Variable Gini EGR 
 
Variable Gini EGR   
  
              
  
Health1 0.06 0.03 
 
Edu1 0.06 0.03 
 
Work1 0.10 0.05 
 
Econw1 0.10 0.06   
Health2 0.05 0.02 
 
Edu2 0.09 0.05 
 
Work2 0.26 0.15 
 
Econw2 0.13 0.06   
Health3 0.12 0.06 
 
Edu3 0.16 0.08 
 
Work3 0.19 0.09 
 
Econw3 0.29 0.15   
Health4 0.17 0.08 
 
Edu4 0.17 0.08 
 
Work4 0.22 0.11 
 
Econw4 0.29 0.14   
Health5 0.16 0.07 
 
Edu5 0.11 0.05 
 
Work5 0.07 0.03 
 
Econw5 0.16 0.07   
  
   
Edu6 0.16 0.08 
 
Work6 0.04 0.02 
 
Econw6 0.29 0.15   
  
       
Work7 0.02 0.01 
 
Econw7 0.28 0.13   
  
       
Work8 0.13 0.06 
    
  
  Work9 0.12 0.05   
Social Capital   Politics   Safety   Social Welfare   
Variable Gini EGR 
 
Variable Gini EGR 
 
Variable Gini EGR 
 
Variable Gini EGR   
  
              
  
Soc1 0.10 0.04 
 
Pol1 0.09 0.04 
 
Sfty1 0.22 0.11 
 
Swel1 0.10 0.05   
Soc2 0.10 0.05 
 
Pol2 0.05 0.02 
 
Sfty2 0.38 0.19 
 
Swel2 0.04 0.02   
Soc3 0.02 0.01 
 
Pol3 0.04 0.02 
 
Sfty3 0.39 0.18 
 
Swel3 0.06 0.03   
Soc4 0.12 0.05 
 
Pol4 0.05 0.02 
 
Sfty4 0.12 0.05 
 
Swel4 0.07 0.03   
Soc5 0.06 0.03 
 
Pol5 0.07 0.03 
 
Sfty5 0.12 0.06 
    
  
Soc6 0.19 0.08 
 
Pol6 0.02 0.01 
 
Sfty6 0.13 0.07 
    
  
Soc7 0.21 0.10 
 
Pol7 0.02 0.01 
 
Sfty7 0.08 0.04 
    
  
Soc8 0.11 0.05                 
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                  Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015) 
  Table 1 – Disparities in SOC8al, economic, and environmental indicators (cont.)  
Disparities in SOC8al, economic, and environmental indicators (cont.) 
Land Use   Environment   R&D    
Quality of Life and 
SOC8al conditions 
Variable Gini EGR 
 
Variable Gini EGR 
 
Variable Gini EGR 
 
Variable Gini EGR 
  
             
  
Land1 0.20 0.10 
 
Env1 0.38 0.18 
 
Rd1 0.05 0.02 
 
Ql1 0.39 0.21 
Land2 0.15 0.07 
 
Env2 0.11 0.05 
 
Rd2 0.06 0.03 
 
Ql2 0.20 0.10 
  
   
Env3 0.47 0.23 
     
Ql3 0.11 0.05 
        Env4 0.06 0.03           Ql4 0.22 0.12 
                    Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015) 
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Table 2 – Social, economic and environmental performance index (SEEPI) 
 
Region  
Aritmetic mean 
on original 
values 
normalized on 
the interval 
[min,max] Rank 
Geometric mean 
of z values  
normalized on 
the interval 
[M-3, M+3]  
 
 
 
 
 
Rank 
Piemonte 0.528 7 0.515 5 
Valle d'Aosta 0.552 5 0.513 6 
Lombardia 0.530 6 0.510 7 
Trentino-Alto Adige 0.644 1 0.597 1 
Veneto 0.525 8 0.486 10 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.566 2 0.545 2 
Liguria 0.508 9 0.491 8 
Emilia-Romagna 0.560 3 0.538 4 
Toscana 0.557 4 0.544 3 
Umbria 0.507 10 0.489 9 
Marche 0.500 12 0.479 12 
Lazio 0.504 11 0.480 11 
Abruzzo 0.468 15 0.451 15 
Molise 0.475 14 0.459 14 
Campania 0.398 20 0.357 19 
Puglia 0.400 18 0,367 18 
Basilicata 0.445 17 0.421 16 
Calabria 0.446 16 0.404 17 
Sicilia 0.486 13 0.349 20 
Sardegna 0.400 19 0.463 13 
                                              Source: authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015) 
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             Table 3 – Rank Frequency 
 
Rank PI VA LO TR VE FR LI ER TO UM MA LA AB MO CM PU BA CA SI SA 
1 0 0 0 999575 0 37 0 97 291 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 2898 1 354 1 456340 0 175472 364935 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 10 13685 14 62 28 302865 0 249538 433796 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 2406 60622 551 9 234 239232 12 500637 196262 11 1 21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 459397 316363 130609 0 7424 1514 2830 70271 4617 4798 315 1783 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 30 
6 417799 198102 320399 0 16417 11 15872 3729 90 20923 1409 4862 0 190 0 0 0 0 0 199 
7 106735 231232 457922 0 46031 1 65449 234 7 60977 6272 22980 1 786 0 0 0 0 0 1370 
8 13160 87659 72638 0 225310 0 303111 22 2 183239 29574 68277 29 2918 0 0 1 0 0 14063 
9 425 44262 13960 0 140473 0 252711 0 0 277223 99798 137621 137 8449 0 0 0 2 0 24939 
10 63 28263 3349 0 135533 0 174880 0 0 248078 188519 164327 839 19395 0 0 9 3 0 36743 
11 5 11950 485 0 162381 0 131240 0 0 142344 263167 175134 5328 44753 0 0 7 8 0 63196 
12 0 4405 65 0 141248 0 42665 0 0 49526 263389 253360 21152 95754 0 0 45 29 0 128360 
13 0 488 7 0 73239 0 9892 0 0 11924 109913 121075 115996 238797 0 0 264 89 0 318317 
14 0 67 0 0 37033 0 1245 0 0 926 32041 43764 290271 359241 0 0 1920 602 0 232891 
15 0 4 0 0 13849 0 86 0 0 25 5543 6639 541594 228176 0 0 23479 3984 0 176619 
16 0 0 0 0 609 0 7 0 0 6 58 150 21371 1393 1 2 896435 76815 0 3153 
17 0 0 0 0 189 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 3282 97 617 2725 77825 915063 76 120 
18 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 193856 707119 15 3292 95717 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 552132 208143 0 111 239614 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 253394 82011 0 2 664593 0 
             Source: authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015). 
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                       Table 4 –  Criteria with the five  greatest  average  weights in the set of vector of weights assigning to   
                       the corresponding region the best position 
 
HEALTH1 POL5 WORK4 SFTY2 LAND2 
Abruzzo 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.029 
 
WORK3 SQ3 WORK8 SOC7 WORK5 
Basilicata 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.03 
 
WORK8 SFTY6 SFTY2 WORK2 LAND2 
Calabria 0.031 0.031 0.03 0.027 0.026 
 
POL4 LAND2 SQ1 WORK5 SQ2 
Campania 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 
 
WORK8 HEALTH3 HEALTH1 POL1 POL7 
Emilia-Romagna 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.023 
 
WORK8 WORK6 SFTY3 HEALTH3 SFTY6 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.023 
 
ECONW3 HEALTH3 POL3 SFTY1 SOC3 
Lazio 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.027 
 
EDU2 SFTY1 HEALTH2 POL3 RD2 
Liguria 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.024 
 
SFTY1 ECONW7 SWEL2 SWEL4 SQ1 
Lombardia 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 
 
SFTY6 SFTY1 RD1 HEALTH3 LAND1 
Marche 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.032 
 
POL1 LAND2 HEALTH3 SFTY5 WORK2 
Molise 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.032 
 
SFTY4 POL7 SFTY1 HEALTH5 ECONW5 
Piemonte 0.029 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.024 
 
POL5 WORK5 SQ2 POL7 POL3 
Puglia 0.031 0.03 0.028 0.027 0.026 
 
SFTY1 EDU3 ECONW3 SWEL3 SQ1 
Sardegna 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 
 
WORK4 ECONW5 LAND1 HEALTH5 POL6 
Sicilia 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.022 
 
HEALTH3 WORK6 POL2 WORK8 ENV2 
Toscana 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 
 
HEALTH1 HEALTH2 HEALTH3 HEALTH4 HEALTH5 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 
SFTY1 WORK6 ECONW3 HEALTH5 SQ1 
Umbria 0.03 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.024 
 
ENV3 SQ3 WORK5 SFTY7 SFTY1 
Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.02 
 
HEALTH2 HEALTH5 POL7 SWEL3 RD1 
Veneto 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT (2015) 
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Table 5 –  Criteria with the five  greatest  average  weights in the set of vector of weights assigning to the 
corresponding region the worst position 
 
 
SFTY6 SFTY5 SFTY4 HEALTH2 SOC3 
Abruzzo 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.02 0.02 
 
POL6 POL7 HEALTH5 POL4 HEALTH3 
Basilicata 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.024 
 
EDU6 WORK4 POL5 ENV2 HEALTH4 
Calabria 0.032 0.03 0.029 0.028 0.025 
 
SFTY5 HEALTH2 ECONW7 SOC1 SOC2 
Campania 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 
SFTY1 SFTY4 SFTY6 WORK6 ECONW5 
Emilia-Romagna 0.031 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.021 
 
WORK3 ECONW3 SOC5 SQ3 POL3 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.031 0.031 0.03 0.03 0.029 
 
SFTY2 HEALTH2 WORK8 SFTY4 SFTY7 
Lazio 0.029 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
 
SWEL4 HEALTH1 LAND2 SFTY2 SWEL3 
Liguria 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.025 
 
WORK3 LAND2 WORK8 WORK6 SFTY7 
Lombardia 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.024 
 
SOC1 SWEL4 LAND2 WORK9 POL4 
Marche 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.031 
 
ENV1 SFTY6 WORK6 SFTY4 WORK8 
Molise 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.021 
 
ENV2 HEALTH1 EDU2 ENV3 RD2 
Piemonte 0.031 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 
 
SFTY3 SOC3 HEALTH5 SQ3 SQ4 
Puglia 0.023 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 
 
HEALTH1 EDU1 EDU2 WORK3 ECONW7 
Sardegna 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 
ECONW2 WORK9 ECONW4 ENV1 SQ2 
Sicilia 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 
SFTY4 LAND1 WORK7 SOC5 POL7 
Toscana 0.032 0.03 0.029 0.027 0.027 
 
HEALTH3 WORK8 WORK6 HEALTH5 POL2 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.025 0.025 
 
WORK5 ECONW3 SFTY1 ENV3 HEALTH2 
Umbria 0.03 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024 
 
POL7 LAND2 SQ1 HEALTH3 ECONW3 
Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste 0.03 0.03 0.027 0.026 0.026 
 
SFTY1 WORK2 SFTY2 HEALTH3 POL2 
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Veneto 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.035 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT (2015) 
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         Table 6 – Cumulated Rank Acceptability Index 
  Rank 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
PI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.462 0.880 0.986 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VA 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.077 0.394 0.592 0.823 0.911 0.955 0.983 0.995 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.131 0.452 0.909 0.982 0.996 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.024 0.070 0.295 0.436 0.571 0.734 0.875 0.948 0.985 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FR 0.000 0.456 0.759 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.019 0.084 0.387 0.640 0.815 0.946 0.989 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ER 0.000 0.176 0.425 0.926 0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TO 0.000 0.365 0.799 0.995 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.026 0.087 0.270 0.547 0.795 0.938 0.987 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.038 0.137 0.326 0.589 0.852 0.962 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.030 0.098 0.236 0.400 0.575 0.828 0.949 0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.027 0.143 0.434 0.975 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.032 0.077 0.172 0.411 0.770 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.194 0.747 1.000 
PU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.710 0.918 1.000 
BA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.026 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.082 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.335 1.000 
SA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.041 0.077 0.141 0.269 0.587 0.820 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
                      Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015). 
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                          Table 7 – Pairwise comparison index 
  PI VA LO TR VE FR LI ER TO UM MA LA AB MO CM PU BA CA SI SA APCI 
PI 1 0.579 0.787 0 0.974 0 0.995 0.005 0 0.993 0.999 0.997 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.76645 
VA 0.421 1 0.583 0 0.941 0.006 0.898 0.074 0.017 0.896 0.976 0.94 0.999 0.998 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.73745 
LO 0.213 0.417 1 0 0.962 0 0.954 0.001 0 0.948 0.989 0.989 1 0.998 1 1 1 1 1 0.998 0.72345 
TR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VE 0.026 0.059 0.038 0 1 0 0.395 0.001 0 0.426 0.664 0.606 0.966 0.894 1 1 0.999 0.999 1 0.875 0.5474 
FR 1 0.994 1 0 1 1 1 0.692 0.529 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.91075 
LI 0.005 0.102 0.046 0 0.605 0 1 0 0 0.564 0.806 0.83 0.999 0.982 1 1 1 1 1 0.942 0.59405 
ER 0.995 0.926 0.999 0 0.999 0.308 1 1 0.295 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8761 
TO 1 0.983 1 0 1 0.471 1 0.705 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.90795 
UM 0.007 0.104 0.052 0 0.574 0 0.436 0 0 1 0.843 0.732 1 0.98 1 1 1 1 1 0.926 0.5827 
MA 0.001 0.024 0.011 0 0.336 0 0.194 0 0 0.157 1 0.482 0.978 0.896 1 1 1 1 1 0.829 0.4954 
LA 0.003 0.06 0.011 0 0.394 0 0.17 0 0 0.268 0.518 1 0.981 0.886 1 1 1 1 1 0.829 0.506 
AB 0 0.001 0 0 0.034 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.022 0.019 1 0.294 1 1 0.977 0.994 1 0.241 0.32915 
MO 0 0.002 0.002 0 0.106 0 0.018 0 0 0.02 0.104 0.114 0.706 1 1 1 0.998 0.999 1 0.407 0.3738 
CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.231 0 0.001 0.71 0 0.0971 
PU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.769 1 0 0.003 0.859 0 0.13155 
BA 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.023 0.002 1 1 1 0.921 1 0.004 0.24755 
CA 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.006 0.001 0.999 0.997 0.079 1 1 0 0.20415 
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.29 0.141 0 0 1 0 0.07155 
SA 0 0 0.002 0 0.125 0 0.058 0 0 0.074 0.171 0.171 0.759 0.593 1 1 0.996 1 1 1 0.39745 
                        Source: authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015).  
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Table 8 – Multidimensional inequality G-indices and Polarisation EGR-indices 
Rank (l) G
≥l G≤l EGR≥l EGR≤l 
1 0.9999 - 0.9663 - 
2 0.9092 0.0526 0.8441 - 
3 0.8716 0.1010 0.9015 0.0868 
4 0.8397 0.1538 0.9209 0.1434 
5 0.7741 0.2099 0.6025 0.1468 
6 0.7225 0.2580 0.4864 0.2145 
7 0.6728 0.3096 0.5232 0.3432 
8 0.6117 0.3623 0.4261 0.3382 
9 0.5555 0.4078 0.3500 0.3303 
10 0.5048 0.4545 0.3992 0.3466 
11 0.4576 0.5048 0.3153 0.3904 
12 0.4107 0.5593 0.3431 0.5225 
13 0.3605 0.6160 - 0.5853 
14 0.3106 0.6695 - - 
15 0.2628 0.7247 - - 
16 0.2100 0.7885 - - 
17 0.1579 0.8398 - - 
18 0.1030 0.8946 - - 
19 0.0503 0.9270 - - 
20 - 0.9561 - - 
        Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT (2015). EGR weighted for population, alpha=1; beta=1. 
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                                             Graphs 1 – Probability of belonging to the group of top five 
regions  
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Source: authors' elaboration on ISTAT (2015)
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Graph 2 – Probability of belonging to the group of bottom 5 regions  
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